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BOOK REVIEW
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW. By J. H. Ely.t
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980. Pp. viii, 268.
$15.00.
REVIEWED BY GARY C. LEEDES*
Almost two centuries ago, following a ruling of a North Carolina court
which, in effect, declared unconstitutional an act of the legislature, Richard
Spaight was dubious and fearful. He admitted that many of the Assembly's
acts had been intemperate, but the question he posed to James Iredell was this:
"If the judiciary acts as a check on the legislature, then who is to act as a check
upon the judiciary?"' Mr. Spaight's question still reverberates, but the Consti-
tution provides no singular answer. In our own century, when the Warren
Court was making new law, Learned Hand restated another question that stirs
nagging doubts: "Who made [courts] the arbiters of all political authority in
the nation with a discretion to act or not, as they please[d]?"
'2
Challenging questions that arouse doubts and fears3 tend to stimulate the-
ories--or apologies. In Democracy and Distrust, Professor Ely formulates a
theory which designates a boundary for judicial review that is narrower than
the "prevailing academic line."'4 Courts, however, are powerful within the
Elysian field and are free to substitute their judgment in political cases.5
When the courts determine that "representative government cannot be
trusted,"'6 judicial scrutiny should be strict; notions of political thickets, defer-
t Professor of Law, Harvard University.
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T. C. Williams School of Law.
1. See R. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUB-
LIC 8 (1971).
2. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 15 (1958).
3. There is "fear that extensive reliance upon courts instead of self-government through
democratic processes may deaden a peoples' sense of moral and political responsibility for their
own future." A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103
(1976). There are many other fears as well: "Government by judiciary will fail ... because its
present success exalts autocracy over democracy ... faction over society, equality over liberty
... and even mindlessness over reason." Kurland, Government by Judiciary, 2 U. ARK. L.J. 307,
320 (1979). It is therefore understandable that theories of "democratic" judicial review are de-
vised to counteract the fears of the Supreme Court's critics. See, e.g., E. ROSTOw, THE SOvER-
EIGN PREROGATIVE (1962). It is a salutory pastime. Theories build logical bridges connecting
judicial activism with some superior and binding valid norm.
4. J. Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43 (1980). Cf. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence ofPro.
cess-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980) (Ely's "process theme" can deter-
mine almost nothing without a full theory of substantive rights and values to specify its
presuppositions and supplement its content).
5. "Elysium is as far as to
The very nearest Room
If in that Room a Friend await
Felicity or Doom--"
3. THE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON 1180 (T. Johnson ed. 1955).
6. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 183.
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ence, and comity are inappropriate.
Our system of government has its share of antinomies. 7 For example,
there is a "commitment to control by a majority of the governed." Majority
rule, however, is a democratically faulty tenet to the extent that it allows the
majority to subject the minority to tyranny. Thus, there is a tension. The
"tricky task" is to protect the minority, or as Ely emphasizes, the "minorities,"
in a way "that is not a flagrant contradiction of the principle of majority
rule."9 Ely relies on courts to perform that task whenever the majority abuses
our democratic system by denying political equality.
Minorities need judicial intervention when the processes of government,
that is, the "mechanisms of decision and distribution,"'10 are "undeserving of
trust."11 More specifically, judicial review is justified
7. The republic was to be governed by law, not men, yet the limits of law were to be deter-
mined by the state of the body politie's knowledge, morality, and common agreement. See Ros-
siter, The Political Thought of the American Revolution, in 3 SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 227 (rev.
ed. 1963). The states are politically equal, but there should be proportional representation of the
entire population in the United States House of Representatives.
There should be equal participation, but participation in public affairs was not so much a
right as a privilege, limited to men who "have an evident stake in society." Id Representatives
should be impartial and not give undue influence to any segment of the population, yet Madison
hoped that the "laws should silently 'reduce extreme wealth. . . and raise extreme indigence
towards a state of comfort."' R. HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 81 (1969).
Blacks were created equal but born and kept in slavery. Fundamental natural rights were
inalienable but "can be surrendered by a freely contracting individual-in return for a proper
equivalent"; namely peace, order, and "the good of the whole." Rossiter, supra, at 116. There was
a higher unwritten law, yet somehow it can be found in the Constitution. A substantial number of
delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia wanted judicial review to act as a
check upon the legislative and executive branches of the central government; yet overwhelmingly
in committee, the Convention rejected a council of revision and structured the Constitution to
reflect the very different separation of powers principle. See P. SMITH, 3 THE SHAPING OF
AMERICA 62, 72, 91 (1980).
The Supreme Court was generally recognized as an authority to interpret the Constitution,
yet John Marshall feared impeachment and destruction of the Court if he exercised the power of
judicial review against Jefferson and Madison in favor of William Marbury. The written Consti-
tution was intended to be the ultimate check on the limits of the Government's power, but how
this check would operate in practice was a mystery, and "roughly one half of the nation could not
agree with the other half about what the words in the Constitution really meant" (in 1787 or now).
Id at 108.
8. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 7.
9. Id at 7-8. Ely writes, "rule in accord with the consent of a majority of those governed is
the core of the American governmental system". Id at 7. But Ely often treats the commitment to
majority rule as if it were simply an "expedient" to make the principle of "political equality" a
working part of a complicated system. See also M. SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME
COURT 220 (1964). But Robert A. Dahl writes, "no amount of tampering with democratic theory
can conceal the fact that a system in which the policy preferences of minorities prevail over major-
ities is at odds with the traditional criteria for distinguishing a democracy from other political
systems." Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,
6 PUB. L. 279, 283 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Decisionmaking). Dahl perhaps goes too far. The
real danger is this: overzealous protection of minorities by courts replaces majority tyranny with
judicial tyranny. For, as Richard Spaight worried, if the judiciary goes too far in checking the
legislature's lawmaking power, then who can check the judiciary? Dal also writes, "should a
legislature represent interests or individuals? It cannot do both. For if interests are to be given
equal representation, then individuals must be denied equal representation." R. DAHL, DEMOC-
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 184 (3d ed. 1976) (hereinafter cited
as DEMOCRACY). Ely does not suggest any way out of this dilemma.
10. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 181.
11. Id at 103.
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when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out, or (2) though
no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden
to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some mi-
nority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the pro-
tection afforded other groups by a representative system.12
In this deplorable situation, representatives violate their "duty of equal con-
cern and respect."'
13
Ely argues that the "elected representatives are the last persons we should
trust with the identification of. . . these situations."'14 This vacuum creates a
role for the courts, particularly the federal courts. Why the courts? Again,
basically because, like a disinterested "referee,"' 15 courts should enforce the
rules of the game (the Constitution) when there are "failures of representa-
tion" 16 contrary to the preeminent values of participation that are part of "the
American system."' 17 Ely describes his model as a "representation-reinforcing
theory of judicial review."' 8
12. Id
13. Id at 98. Equal concern and respect does not connote economic equality or equality of
outcome. Ely is a liberal, not a Marxist. Nevertheless, concerning this indefinite norm, one asks,
"equal concern and respect with reference to what: rights, each person's moral worth, needs,
abilities, interests?" Does the quality of the concern and respect owed vary at all depending on the
group's actual stake in the decision or the intensity of its members' feelings? See E. REDFORD,
DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 16-17 (1969). Doesn't one have to earn respect? Ely
leaves all these questions in the final analysis to the Supreme Court of the United States.
14. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 103. Is the prohibition of consensual sexual conduct between
homosexuals a result of hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interests?
Or is it the result of legitimate opposition? Assuming there is a difference, and I submit there is,
should the federal.courts treat all cases alike with strict scrutiny, or should it defer to the judgment
of the elected representatives of each community? Ely believes that homosexuals should be added
to the list of suspect classifications that triggers special scrutiny and that they should "seek salva-
tion in the courts." Id at 163. Relief, maybe; salvation-a bit difficult even for the Supreme
Court.
15. Id at 103. The Republican platform of 1980 and Jimmy Carter promised to appoint
federal judges who are not disinterested. Wermeil, The Supreme Court, Will It Become a Cam-
ain Issue?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1980, at 12, col. 3. One can get too carried away with the
feree analogy especially if the Court acts like National Football League Commissioner Pete
Rozelle instead of the fellows with the striped shirts. See also P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CON-
STITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 56 (1969); see also note 75 infra. Moreover, "ifjustices were
appointed primarily for their 'judicial' qualities without regard to their basic attitudes on funda-
mental questions of public policy, the Court could not play the influential role in the American
political system that it does in reality play." Dahl, Decisionmaking, supra note 9, at 285.
On the other hand the referee analogy is a useful fiction. Widespread public recognition that
the Court is simply another political institution rather than an exclusively legal one "would solve
one set of problems at the price of creating another" set. Id at 280. Ely wants us to perceive the
courts as referees who act politically. Is that a non sequitur?
16. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 181.
17. Id at 102.
18. Id at 181. Representation "is a rather loose concept. . . used in different ways by differ-
ent writers, each of whom tends to claim that the meaning he attributes to it is the only proper
meaning." A BIRCH, REPRESENTATION 124 (1971). The term "participation" is also used to refer
to a wide variety of different rights by different political theorists. See C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPA-
TION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (1970). It is "impossible to construct a single a priori theory,
model, or definition of democracy that will command universal support." M. SHAPIRO, supra note
9, at 218. Ely is of course well aware of the exclusive and abstract nature of these terms and
focuses his attentions on the underlying assumptions of "our system," J. ELY, supra note 4, at vii.
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The argument for entrusting the courts with the power to make the abid-
ing premises of the democratic system "a reality"1 9 comes down to necessity.
When elected representatives violate their trust, there is supposedly no other
peaceful recourse. The courts shore up the system by performing basically two
functions:
1. "Clearing the Channels of Political Change" 20 which are clogged
a. when rights in the ballot access and "voting area"21 are de-
nied, or
b. if the rights of "free speech, publication, and political as-
sociation ' 22 are impeded.
2. "Facilitating the Representation of Minorities" 23-or at least
those minorities whose attempts to become part of protective co-
alitions "prove recurrently unavailing." 24
A court enlisted to perform these functions is vindicating, not violating the
system's "underlying democratic assumptions. '2 5
The courts should perform their role adventurously.26 Federal courts no
He derives these assumptions, pertaining to representation and equal participation, from his sur-
vey of selected historical documents, id at 77-87, his analysis of the Constitution's text and struc-
ture, id at 88-101, and our constitutional development, with no small emphasis on footnote four
of Carolene Products, id at 75-77. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938).
What emerges is impressionistic; Ely highlights the broad themes of maximum political
equality and wide participation. He ignores, however, a number of complications in the move-
ment known as democracy. Since the purpose of judicial review is to vindicate the underlying
assumptions of our system, Ely's tendency to reduce them to catchy slogans is unfortunate. We
lose sight of the crosscurrents, discontinuities, and contradictions noted by other writers. See gen-
eralo R. ELLIS, supra note 1; E. REDFORD, supra note 13; see also R. DAHL, supra note 9, at 188,
204,216-17,228-29,264-68. Butsee G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 596-
615 (1969). Ely emphasizes equality but notfreedom, "a tricky word" either in tension with equal-
ity, or its complement, depending on one's usage. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 228-29. See M.
FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 128 (1980). P. KURLAND, supra note 15, at 98-110;
see also B. BAiLvN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 117-19, 139-40,
188, 229, 283-84, 293-94, 318-19 (1969). Ely often treats indiscriminately the rights of individuals
and the rights of groups. Although a group is an abstraction from the individuals who constitute
it, "[t]o think that groups behave like individuals is to [confuse] abstractions with life." C. CUR-
TIS, JR., LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 253 (1947). Ely ignores the fact that power depends not
merely on votes and representation, but on complex social and economic power, prestige, organi-
zation, and many other factors in and out of government. In the brokerage of claims, mediators
strive for stability, and the goal is a working democracy-not simply an ideal. See E. REDFORD,
supra note 13, at 26-27, 199-200. Through the interaction of leaders of different types in strategic
positions of influence who engage in the negotiation necessary for the brokerage of claims, polit-
ical equality is both difficult to measure and to attain. See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 230-31.
Ely refers to tyranny, but "[tihe concept of tyranny, or rather the less dramatic idea of 'the
abuse of power,' may not be susceptible of very precise definition." M. VILE, CONSTITUTION-
ALILSM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 308 (1967). Ely also ignores the contributions made to
democracy by the two-party system. See text accompanying notes 85-91 infra. Despite all this
ambiguity, the "assumptions" that Ely highlights are to be the justification for judicial review.
19. J. ELY, supra note 4, at vii.
20. Id ch. S.
21. Id at 116.
22. Id at 105.
23. Id ch. 6.
24. Id at 151.
25. Id at vii.
26. Courts should expand "the set of suspect classifications beyond the core case of race," id
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longer are to be so inhibited by the question that preoccupied Jefferson and
Madison, Frankfurter and Harlan: Is this exercise of power appropriate for
the central government's judiciary branch? When the system malfunctions,
action, not prudence, is required.
While clerking at the Supreme Court, Ely witnessed firsthand how the
pursuit of "intellectual disinterestedness" (a phrase coined by Justice Frank-
furter27) worked to promote values incompatible with Chief Justice Warren's
humanitarian impulses and Ely's own liberal "political philosophy."28 The
designations "political question," "our federalism," "separation of powers,"
and "cases or controversies" were used as excuses to avoid controversial polit-
ical cases. No longer is prudence a virtue; Ely's new constitutional theory is
contrived to subordinate the values furthered by judicial restraint to the "par-
ticipational values" 29 woven into the fabric of American democracy.
Professor Ely's theory of constitutional law is deliberately designed to im-
plement his political philosophy. Some of his ideas are drawn from the liberal
"tradition of utilitarianism."'30 His test for the adequacy of a well-functioning
political system is basically the same as Bentham's and James Mill's test: Does
it protect the interests of the governed against the abuse of power?3'
Like Bentham's calculus, 32 Ely's theory designates no particular substan-
at 148, and review such classifications with "special scrutiny," Id at 146. If illicit motivation"appears materially to have influenced," id at 138, government action, it is unconstitutional.
Since the "ins have a way of wanting to make sure the outs stay out," id at 106, courts must
employ techniques to identify the "groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials
have no apparent interest in attending." Id at 151.
Several provisions in the Constitution are useful to prevent agents of the majority from "sin-
gling a person out," id at 172, owing to a separate set of rules reserved for "the comparatively
powerless," id at 177. The provisions that can be "viewed through this prism," id at 172, include
the following: the fourth and eighth amendments, id at 172-73, the Just Compensation Clause, id
at 97-98, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV, id at 90, and the fourteenth amend-
ment, id at 22-30, the negative implications of the Commerce Clause, id at 91, and, not the least
important, the ninth amendment, id at 34-41. Similarly, the Republican Form of Government
Clause expresses the "ideal," id at 119, of nondiscriminatory distribution of the franchise, and it
and the Equal Protection Clause protect a wide variety of rights in the "voting area," id at 118.
The Republican Form Clause could also serve federal courts willing to extend the nondelegation
doctrine to the states, a doctrine still useful in policing the process of representation, id at 131-34.
The first amendment, of course, is "critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic
process." Id at 105.
But Ely does not limit himself to rights clearly implicit in the Constitution. For example, the
right to migrate and relocate "fits quite snugly," id at 179, into the theory, because "one should
have an option of escaping an incompatible majority." Id
Ely's theory pulls out all the stops. It is a call for compulsory judicial action but not one
imprisoned by the words of the Constitution. Instead, it is vitalized by the Framers' choice of
language that is "capable of growth," id at 30, and consistent with democratic assumptions con-
cerning "equal participation in the processes of government." Id at 77. His detractors, of course,
will not hesitate to say that he uses the Constitution not as a guide, but as an instrument-perhaps
a pretext-for courts to "get away with intervening," id at 48, in the political process.
27. 371 U.S. x (1962) (Justice Frankfurter on his retirement).
28. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 72.
29. Id at 75 n.*.
30. Id at 187 n.14.
31. See L. MACFARLANE, MODERN POLITICAL THEORY 239 (1973); Benn, Democracy, in 2
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 338, 341 (1967). But see I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIB-
ERTY 130, 165 (1970).
32. As John Rawls put it, referring to Bentham's calculus: "In calculating. . . it does not
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tive values, such as privacy, as fundamental. It prescribes, instead, a method.
But the utilitarian's calculus (through its manifestation, the political system)
malfunctions if it is unable to count and respect everyone's informed prefer-
ences. Accurate counting is insured by auxiliary rights in the voting area and
by side constraints like freedom of speech. The whole constitutional system,
nevertheless, becomes a tool for tyranny if the elected representatives arbitrar-
ily disadvantage the politically weak in contradiction of the system's underly-
ing value of political equality. This sham the judges must not tolerate.
Ely's rationalization for judicial review is not completely original. Some
forty years ago Justice Jackson wrote, "when the channels of opinion and of
peaceful persuasion are corrupted or clogged. . . the democratic system is
threatened . . . In that event the Court, by intervening, restores the
processes of democratic government; it does not disrupt them."'33 But Jackson,
mindful of Bentham's diatribes against the courts,34 went on to warn would-be
guardians of the system that some of the "most subtle and pervasive forms of
intolerance are not technically violations of the Constitution. . .and cannot
be dealt with in the courts." 35 Jackson also regarded the procedures of consti-
tutional litigation as "clumsy" and "tricky,"3 6 so "what is wanted," he said, "is
not innovation, but a return to the. . . conviction that it is an awesome thing
to strike down an act of the legislature. . .[a] power. . . not to be used save
where the occasion is clear beyond fair debate."
'37
Ely tinkers with the Bentham calculus and innovates by exalting the dem-
ocratic system as policed by the federal courts over the nation, substantive
rights, or the individual. In Ely's view, the courts will serve both nation and
individual by meliorating mistrust and by tying together the interests of all,
however artificially,38 for the common venture.
Ely's political philosophy and his theory of judicial review, which coin-
cide neatly, demand arrangements that satisfy his conception of equal partici-
matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for. We are to arrange institutions so as to obtain
the greatest sum of satisfactions; we ask no questions about their source or quality .... J.
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971).
33. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 285 (1941). Ely gladly ac-
knowledges that his justification for judicial review guided the Warren Court whose "approach
was foreshadowed in a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., decided in
1938." J. ELY, supra note 4, at 75.
34. See R. JACKSON, .supra note 33, at 322-23.
35. Id at 285.
36. Id at 288. Ely does not discuss the Court's prudential concerns or rules of self-restraint
at any length. His theory, however, is designed to eliminate prudence and self-restraint when the
system is malfunctioning and when representatives cannot be trusted. Justice Jackson, however,
and most Justices hold to the safer belief that "self-restraint should lead to prompt and final
declination to interfere with the legislative process in those cases where the lawsuit is inappropri-
ate to overrule statecraft." Id at 310.
37. Id at 323.
38. Of course, it has to be an "artificial" identification of interests in a society in which per-
sons mistrust each other and their governors. Cf. E. HALEvy, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC
RADICALISM 404-07 (1972) (discussion of Bentham's political and constitutional philosophy).
Bentham maintained that the judge's role was to counsel the legislature, not control it. See J.
BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED ch. 21, reprinted in C. MORRIS, THE GREAT
LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS: SELECTED READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 274, 287 (1959).
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pation--"everyone's vote is to count for the same.' '39 This means, at the very
least, that "the franchise must be universally available, absolute equality of the
vote and equality in the size of constituencies are essential."'40 This demand
goes beyond those of Bentham,41 James Mill, 4 2 and J.S. Mill.43 Until recently
most political theorists "rejected universal suffrage" as an essential ingredient
of democracy.44 Significant restrictions on the right to vote and ballot access,
engendering bitter controversies, are common in the United States. Indeed,
the concept of separation of powers, mixed with checks and balances, the bi-
cameral legislature, and the electoral college, if not judicial review itself, limit,
in many respects, the principle of equal participation.45
Theorists, who agree that equal participation is essential to a constitu-
tional democracy, disagree when they discuss how extensive equal participa-
tion should be. The inability to agree on this question is, according to John
Rawls, the main problem.46 Another dispute renewed by Ely's theory of judi-
cial review is his assumption that courts are better qualified than the body
politic to solve this main problem.
Ely is obviously concerned with ensuring a "broadened access"' 47 to a
more responsive and more representative government. This was also the con-
cern of the Warren Court whose decisions, Ely asserts, have a "deep struc-
ture."' 48 Professor Ely refers to deep structure presumably because "our
Constitution is guilty of an embarrassing lapse; it contains no broad guarantee
of the right to participate in the democratic process."'49 For example, the origi-
nal Constitution, for the most part, "appears to have treated voting rights as a
matter solely of state concern and permitted the states wide tolerance in decid-
ing who could-and who could not-vote."50
39. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 122.
40. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 6 (1975).
41. Bentham hesitated to grant women and illiterates the vote. See E. HALEVY, Supra note
38, at 416.
42. James Mill would not grant the right to vote to women or young men on the grounds that
it was too expensive. See BENN, supra note 31.
43. J.S. Mill's idea of democracy was a "meritocracy by consent." See L. MACFARLANE,
supra note 31, at 205-06.
44. J. RAWLs, supra note 32, at 231; but see J. ELY, supra note 4, at 122.
45. J. RAwi.s, supra note 32, at 224.
46. Id
47. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 74.
48. Id at 73. The Warren Court opinions form a mosaic that has a distinct character, but
according to critics, lacks legitimate, coherent doctrinal underpinnings. See G. WHITE, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 317-68 (1976). Ely's work is important because it provides that
missing foundation. Nothing gives greater credibility to a political value than the thought that it is
an essential element of a historical movement. Such a value can then be propagandized as one
that is historically necessary. See R. NISBEr, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 4 (1980).
49. B. NEUBORNE & A. EISENBERO, THE RIGHTS OF CANDIDATES AND VOTERS 13 (rev. ed.
1980).
50. Id See also W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE (1965); J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 117-18 (1956).
"Is federalism still a reigning value, or merely a practical inconvenience?" R. MCCLOSKEY,
THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 331 (1972). Ely makes no special effort to reconcile the tension
between minority rights and states' rights. Perhaps a state's insistence on its political equality, or
its rights, when they are in conflict with the rights of powerless minorities, is, in Ely's book, just
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Ely shrugs off the apparent lapses in the Constitution by emphasizing the
inadequacy of constitutional theory. What is inadequate in his view is not the
Constitution, but our way of interpreting it. In his words, "[c]ontemporary
constitutional debate is dominated by a false dichotomy," 51 which forces us to
choose between "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism." 52 Interpretivism
sticks closely to "norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Consti-
tution." 53 Noninterpretivism does not necessarily stick closely to anything.
54
Neither noninterpretivism nor interpretivism--said to be the only two
competing theories of constitutional law prevailing at the moment-are recon-
cilable with the "underlying democratic theory of our government." 55 With
respect to interpretivism, this is a startling argument, because the interpretivist
argues that he "takes his values from the Constitution, which means. . . they
ultimately came from the people."' 56 Ely points out that the people who rati-
fied the critical provisions of the Constitution "have been dead for a century or
two" and quotes Jefferson's remark that "the earth belongs . . . to the liv-
ing.",57 Jefferson, however, was writing privately about a continuing right to
revolution, certainly not judicial review 8 As regards judicial review, he be-
lieved it was a dreadful threat to states rights, which was then a party cry for
democracy and popular control of government, and argued: "Our peculiar
security is in the possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a
blank paper by construction."59 This is one of the interpretivists' better argu-
ments. What is wrong with it?
In brief, despite its allure, interpretivism is "incomplete." 60 Reference by
courts to the Framers' thoughts is often unrealistic; "one cannot hope to gather
another instance of the malfunctioning of the democratic system. But isn't participation by indi-
viduals more meaningful when tendencies towards more centralization yield to local control?
51. J. ELY, supra note 4, at vii.
52. Id at 1.
53. Id
54. Ely is keen to distinguish his own theory from the "academically popular," id at 75,
noninterpretivism that is fueled by a desire to "vindicate particular substantive values," id at 74,
which supposedly are "important or fundamental." Id He reminds us that discoveries of funda-
mental values are mirror images of the searcher's own personal preferences. No one has demon-
strated more effectively than Ely the misleading nature of euphemistic terminology such as
"natural law" (uselessly vague or inherently subjective), "neutral principles" and "reason" (not a
source of values with substantive content), "tradition" and "consensus" (these sources are manip-
ulatable, too often at the expense of minorities' rights), and "the idea of progress" (undemocratic
guesswork by the elite). Id at 43-72. In short, there "isn't any impersonal value source out there,"
id at 72, discoverable byjudges. Therefore, the worrisome undemocratic aspects of judicial re-
view are exacerbated by the noninterpretivist approach, which is infamous for "second-guessing
the legislature's value choices." Id at vii. His critique of noninterpretivism is no less devastating
because his own theory relies on some of the same unreliable criteria. But see Tushnet, Darkness
on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J.
1037 (1980); Tribe, supra note 4.
55. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 4.
56. Id at 8.
57. Id at 11.
58. R. Moius, SEVEN WHO SHAPED OUR DEsTINY 138 (1973).
59. 4 T. JEFFERSON, WRrr1Nos 506 (Washington ed. 1859), quoted in Black, The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 869-70 (1960).
60. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 76.
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a reliable picture of their intentions .... ,,61 Worse, many provisions, even
the less open-ended clauses, are unintelligible and require "the injection of
content" 62 drawn from outside the Constitution. Worst of all, a clause-bound
interpretivist who reads "constitutional provisions as self-contained units" 63 is
incapable of "keeping faith with the document's promise." 64 Its promise can
be realized only by determining the Constitution's "specific implications for
each age . . . in contemporary context."165 Hence, interpretivism is "hoist by
its own petard. '' 66 Q.E.D.
Justice Black was a living contradiction of Ely's theory. "The quintessen-
tial interpretivist,"67 he was aware of the more glaring weaknesses of a clause-
bound interpretivism. His constitutional philosophy was not "a historically
straitjacketed literalism."' "8 For the most part, he had the "ability to reason by
analogy, to sense the relevance of constitutionally stated principles in unfamil-
iar settings."' 69 The Justice was among the staunchest defenders of civil liber-
ties ever, yet "when his constitutional philosophy (interpretivism) and his
political philosophy (liberalism) diverged. . .[he] went with his constitutional
philosophy. '70 Justice Black was scrupulous, believing, with Jefferson, that
the Constitution could be destroyed by courts acting as roving commissions.
Ely sees something irresponsible about the Justice's scruples: Black's constitu-
tional philosophy proved to be too legalistic to keep the broad democratic
themes in tune with the changing times, and the momentum of the Warren
Court's egalitarianism.
Whatever else it might be, Ely's theory of judicial review is not unduly
legalistic. In fact, Justice Black would likely regard so-called "democratic as-
sumptions" and the values of participation to be criteria no more definite than
our "Anglo-American legal heritage," a test that he believed left the judges
free to decide a case unmindful of the real limits imposed by the Constitu-
tion.71 Ely demurs on the irresistibly tempting ground that the mode of review
he has developed "represents the ultimate interpretivism.
' 72
Ely insists that a court concerned "only with questions of participation" 73
can be in harmony with the "broader themes" 74 that inspired the original
Constitution, and which animate it still. For John Hart Ely, those "broader
61. Id at 17.
62. Id at 41 n.*.
63. d at 73.
64. Id at 89 n.*.
65. Id at I.
66. Id at 43.
67. Id at 2.
68. Id .
69. Id at 185 n.2.
70. Id at 2.
71. See Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
72. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 88. Ely is also familiar with Aristotle's insight that people writing
briefs for new theories must, if "the written law tells against our case ... appeal to the universal
law, and insist on its greater equity and justice." Id at 49 n.*.
73. Id at 181.
74. Id at 88 n.*.
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themes" are the real Constitution.75 I respectfully question that approach.
Ely does not distinguish, as he should, between rhetoric and reality, and he
exaggerates the extent to which our noble aspirations have become law.
The Ely plan is submitted as a modem counterpart of the founding fa-
thers' attempt to design a mechanism that corrects imbalances in the system of
representation. Ely reinforces the original machinery by making the federal
courts the sturdy balance wheel of democracy. The balance wheel is activated
when legislativeprocess deviates from the norm of equal concern and respect.
This "theme" presupposes the existence of what Richard Hofstadter called a
"general oneness of spirit" and the hope of a "comprehensive unity or har-
mony."76 These notions were wistful in the 1780's; they are fatuous in the
1980's. The political arena is occupied by some extremist elements featuring
nasty, mean-spirited people motivated by malice and hostility. In addition,
there is tumultuous discord, and a no-holds-barred partisan competition
among opposed selfish interest groups.
There is naivet6 in the suggestion that the Supreme Court (plus hundreds
of federal judges) is, or ever could be, a totally benign, apolitical, and consis-
tent force that restores virtue to a power structure once it becomes corrupt.
The courts, on occasion, can initiate reforms if they are prudent and clever.
Timing counts. But Ely's zeal for compulsory judicial activism in the service
of participational values takes too optimistic a view of the judicial system's
capability. Politics usually involves the choice between lesser evils, and is gov-
erned by circumstance, not by homiletics.
Widespread faith in the efficacy of judicial review is a mixed blessing. It
dilutes the importance of the representative's own obligation to his constitu-
ents and the Constitution, which leads to increased abuses of power, requiring
more judicial intervention, and so on.7 7 The prospect of a quick judicial fix
also immunizes legislation in the short run from concerted political pressure
applied by minority groups. If judicial review is perceived as a less costly,
more efficient method of reform than an organized and vigorous political ef-
fort, the democratic process suffers in the long run. Thus, "we see the wisdom
of Solon's remark, that no more good must be attempted than the nation can
bear."
78
Faith in the efficacy of judicial review may be misguided. We do not
know that judicial review, all things considered, results in a better quality of
representation for minority groups, or anyone else. There is inadequate em-
pirical evidence to support Ely's intuitive judgment.79 Another drawback to
Ely's approach is that it creates excessive dependence on the judiciary by the
very minority groups his theory singles out for special protection. No minority
75. It must be desperation rather than necessity that impels some of us to prefer the Court's
double standards and sliding scales to the legislature's double standards. For the empirical evi-
dence of the Supreme Court's double standards see A. Amsterdam, I TUL. LAW. 2 (1980).
76. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at ix.
77. See R. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 17 (1979).
78. R. ELLIS, supra note 1, at 29 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
79. See R. MUELLER, supra note 77, at 5.
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group can count on the federal courts, except on occasion, to impose an egali-
tarian ideology that compensates for legislative insensitivity to the needs of the
group. The Supreme Court will not abandon "prudential" strategies, because
it cannot "neglect the task of sustaining political support for itself."80
Professor Ely's confidence in judicial review is unusual. He believes that
"the process by which the laws that govern society are made" 8' should be
subjected to intensified judicial review. Why? Again he reminds us, courts
should be concerned with "participational values."'82 Ely's awkward term,
"participational values," confuses the concepts of representation and partici-
pation. They are quite different. For the question relevant to representation is
not how many, but how well.
The quality of representation is not easy to evaluate. In most cases, judi-
cial techniques are too crude and unsuitable to protect the interests of disfa-
vored minority groups from a majority that needs an attitudinal adjustment.
But Ely insists on a judicial "strategy" that enforces the "duty of equal con-
cern and respect."8 3 In view of the limited tools8 4 the courts have at their
disposal to enforce this alluring norm (for example, shifting the burden of
proof to demonstrate a close fit between means and ends), Ely's strategy deems
doctrinaire.
Doctrinaire solutions to social problems ultimately prove to be inade-
quate. What supplements the constitutional mechanism, as even the founding
fathers began to realize, is the idea of a party system.85 The two-party system
in the United States has done much to tame the explosive power, sometimes
ignited by courts, latent in the competition among racial, religious, and ethnic
groups. Indeed, the two-party system effectively checks most intolerable
abuses of power by the "ins," provides an outlet for opposition and a means
for change, and yet it somehow arrives at a rough approximation of the public
80. Hazard, The Supreme Court ar a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. Rav. 1, 15 (1978).
81. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 74.
82. Id at 75 n.*.
83. Id at 98.
84. Ely favors objective tests like the categorical rule announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969), which distinguishes between protected and unprotected categories of speech.
Categorical rules are useful to avoid unpredictable results in particular cases and to facilitate the
Supreme Court's supervision over the lower courts. See Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343-44
(1974). These tests, however, are not useful instruments to evaluate the quality of representation.
To the contrary, objective tests in the first amendment area are designed, in part, to avoid second-
guessing the legislative judgment, and to reduce the number of confrontations between a court
and a legislature. See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1142-43
(10th ed. 1980).
In the first amendment and equal protection clause area, Professor Ely also favors use of the
"less restrictive alternative" and "tight fit" approaches. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 105. These re-
quirements, however, rarely shed light on the quality of representation. For example, when time,
place, and manner restrictions are challenged on first amendment grounds, these techniques
should be simply aids used by judges to decide legal disputes concerning the limits of legislative
power. As facets of a case-by-case balancing approach, these techniques, while judicially manage-
able, do not necessarily reveal whether "theprocess is undeserving of trust," 'd at 103, or whether
"the political market is systematically malfunctioning." Id No mechanical test (albeit one ma-
nipulatable by judges) is adequate to measure whether representatives are giving full and fair
consideration to the subject matter of the lawmaking process.
85. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at viii.
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interest. All this occurs as a natural, dynamic, and unquestionably democratic
process. Political parties are movements of the people, not a mechanism im-
posed upon the people by the courts.
"[T]he political parties," one of their critics admits, "created [modem] de-
mocracy and. . . modem democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the par-
ties."'86 Unfortunately, Ely's book discloses no realization on his part that the
two-party system contributes significantly to democracy.87 Idealists may re-
gret the movement towards political parties devoid of equal concern and re-
spect towards the opposition, but they should not ignore the party system in a
discussion about democratic assumptions in the United States.
How the party system works is no mystery. The parties formulate "poli-
cies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate
policies."88 Pragmatic and rational self-interest dictates a selection of candi-
dates who support the positions most favored by the median voter.89 Com-
mentators often lose sight of the median voter in their discussions of majorities
and minorities. But the median voter, by and large, has moderate rather than
radical or illicit policy preferences. The party system, required by necessity to
appeal to the median voter, is more likely to produce mediocre, noncontrover-
sial representatives than tyrants. In short, the two-party system works to
secure adequate representation, if not equal concern and respect for everyone.
It is an imperfect,90 but practical filtering process. Yet "representative govern-
ment," says Herman Finer, "is party government." 91
Ely has to demur and say he seeks to supplement the party system, not
replace it. But the gap can be wide between the level of the federal judges'
"wisdom" and the level of the median voters' knowledge and morality-too
wide on some issues to maintain stability, unity, and respect for the judicial
system. Should the judgment of the federal courts nevertheless always be sub-
stituted? The founding fathers, whom Ely emulates, wanted a mechanism that
delayed momentous political changes until "wisdom prevails among the peo-
ple."92 But Ely, in his modem rush to secure democratic or, more accurately,
republican ideals, cannot wait that long.
A political party, arguably, is no better than the legislature in providing
equal doses of concern and respect to groups who have failed to form effective
coalitions. But the most imponderable theme in Ely's theory is the equal con-
cem and respect norm. This notion, as stated by Ely, is untested in the courts.
86. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT I (1942).
87. See generally C. ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1960). See also R.
DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 322-23; D. REISMAN, INDIVIDUALISM RECONSIDERED 17, 36
(1954).
88. A. DowNs, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 28 (1957).
89. R. MUELLER, supra note 77, at 101.
90. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 271; C. RossiTER, supra note 87, at 45, 51, 173-86.
Rossiter adds that most of what is wrong about parties is what is wrong about the American
people. Id at 173-74.
91. H. FINER, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN GOVERNMENT 237 (rev. ed. 1949). See
also R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 6-7.
92. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 196 (1967).
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What does it mean? The norm possibly requires no more than impartiality
during the process of lawmaking. But even this requirement, modest as it
seems, can impose on the courts a responsibility often greater than they can
bear. Learned Hand wrote: "In theory any statute is always open to challenge
upon the ground that it was not in truth the result of an impartial effort, but
from the outset it was seen that any such inquiry was almost always practically
impossible, and moreover it would be to the last degree 'political.' 93
It is practically impossible, as Judge Hand said, for courts to determine,
mechanically or otherwise, if representatives are truly impartial. First, there is
the problem of identifying the groups entitled to equal concern and respect.
Females presumably constitute a group that counts, but are married females to
be distinguished from the unmarried? Are older females a group? Similarly,
there are feminists and those satisfied with the status quo. Are they separate
groups entitled to equal concern and respect?
A second problem is identification of the spokesmen of the groups. Does
the American Medical Association speak for all physicians? Who speaks for
homosexuals who, as Ely suggests, do not, by and large, speak out at all? Who
speaks for women? Does Jesse Jackson or Andrew Young speak for the
blacks? All blacks? If not all, which ones? How is the Supreme Court to
know which voices not heeded by the legislature or political parties are repre-
sentative of the group? Since it is practically impossible for any court to make
this determination, how can the judge in the ordinary case confidently deny
that a legislature does not give equal concern and respect to a particular
group?
A third problem arises because the equal concern and respect norm pre-
sumably is violated when the legislature--contrary to the interests of myriad
groups--does not consider bills submitted to legislative committees. Ely him-
self does not say specifically that courts should compel legislatures to consider
all introduced bills, but his theory suggests that they should police even this
step in the lawmaking process. Remember, Ely celebrates the Warren Court,
which envisioned a role for itself that went beyond a negative restraining role.
That Court claimed a share in the governing process that was more imposing
and daring than any previous Court. It took the initiative and intervened in
many, perhaps too many, major policy questions that affected the democratic
process.
A fourth problem is that the federal courts' recognition of certain groups
weakens the power of those, within the groups, struggling to become recog-
nized. For example, if the courts recognize the American Medical Association
as the representative spokesman for the medical profession, those physicians
opposed to A.M.A. positions do not receive equal concern and respect.
Without belaboring the point further, it is far from clear that the courts
can do a better job as a referee than the legislatures, which, together with the
political parties, carry on a continuing dialogue with the individuals negotiat-
ing political change.
93. L. HAND, supra note 2, at 67.
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The party system, far from ideal, sometimes (by focusing on the wrong
issues, smothering others) blunts and minimizes sharp conflict at too high a
cost.94 A trade-off of rights for stability and unity is a delicate matter. But
generally the American people know whom to punish when their parties and
officials guess wrong about the central thrust and direction of the democracy.
Free and frequent elections provide the means of punishment for those with a
stake in the outcome. How can minority groups punish the federal courts "for
unkept promises and wrong guesses?"
95
When representatives make wrong guesses, they pay the price. Most of
them do not have the-luxury of staying around long enough to reverse their
erroneous judgments. Why, then, does anybody feel obligated to comply vol-
untarily with a judgment of the Supreme Court perceived to be erroneous?
This is a jurisprudential question; the fact is, we do feel obligated. We do
comply, and this acquiescence suggests that the Court is, after all, an appropri-
ate organ to decide controversial political cases. But this acquiescence does
not help support Ely's novel theory, for the Court, sometimes prudent,96 and
sometimes daring,97 has always taken an entirely different path than the one
he suggests.
98
Ely's theory, it turns out, is not a purely process-oriented approach. If it
were, the public interest would be simply what interested the public. The
point of a purely process-oriented theory is to prevent the democratic system
from favoring any particular political philosophy-neither Herbert Spencer's
nor J.S. Mill's. But Ely took care to make sure that the democratic system he
wants reinforced will carry on the egalitarian movement of the Warren Court.
In short, there is a tilt built into his process-based theory. Therefore, his
description of our country's democratic assumptions should not be mistaken
for an objective or balanced effort to reflect the realities of our system. The
democratic system in the United States guarantees equal political rights only
94. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 7, at 271.
95. See C. ROSSITER, supra note 87, at 45.
96. Justice Jackson acknowledged that "the Court can never quite escape consciousness of its
own infirmities, a psychology which may explain its apparent yielding to expediency." R. JACK-
SON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 25 (1955).
97. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. The Supreme Court's own path (to continue the metaphor) is not always straight; it is
more like a maze. Ely, to his credit, tries to establish a route for the Court that keeps it out of the
substantive due process area. But within the uncharted area of participational values, the Court
has awesome discretion to promulgate general rules governing the political process. Yet Ely does
not trust the federal judges' discretion in freedom of speech cases, for he wants the courts to
adhere strictly to a verbal formula that cannot be easily manipulated and which eliminates "flabby
balancing," J. ELY, supra note 4, at 116, when dangerous speech is "a specific threat," id at 111, to
national security. Incidentally, one of the puzzling features of Ely's theory is his preference for
speech values when campaign reform legislation is challenged. It would seem that the principle of
equal participation loses some of its value when those with greater means are able to use their
wealth to control debate and influence legislation. In such cases, the equal concern and respect
norm would seem to be an insufficient counterweight. See J. R.AwLs, supra note 32, at 224-27.
Ely, however, urges "more stringent review," J. ELY, supra note 4, at 234 n.27, protective of first
amendment values, in cases like Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Thus, Ely's theory ofjudi-
cial review has its own labyrinthian passages.
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to the extent permitted by the political context. The Supreme Court, if not
Ely, generally conforms to this reality.
Those who find Ely's political philosophy agreeable will welcome his rea-
soned elaboration of "a Constitution that needs filling in."99 It is a powerfully
argued, stimulating, and bold analysis of what the role of the federal courts
could be. Others will never be convinced that a process-based constitutional
theory is adequate. 1°° Professor Cox, for example, asks, "[w]here does the
theory stop?''1 1 Has Ely reconciled judicial review with popular sovereignty?
I remain doubtful and, frankly, anxious. Despite a virtuoso performance that
enlivens and enriches an important debate, Ely has not answered Richard
Spaight's question, nor Learned Hand's. 0 2
99. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 73.
100. See Tribe, supra note 4; see also Tushnet, supra note 54.
101. Cox, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 700, 712 (1981).
102. See text accompanying notes 1-2 supra. The words of the Court accepted by "we the
people" as the authoritative last word have made the Court our authority. See C. FRIEDRICH,
TRADITION AND AuTHoRITY (1972). The words of Professor Ely perhaps reinforce the Court's
authority. But as Hobbes wrote: "[w]ords are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them:
but they are the money of fooles, that value them by the authority of anAristotle, a Cicero, or a
Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man." T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 27 (new Am. ed.
1950).
Despite my criticism, I realize that Ely's book is now the standard against which subsequent
commentary on the Supreme Court's role is to be judged.
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